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Abstract: Different types of heterogeneities are prevalent in the Common Property Resources
(CPRs) usage and management. They generally arise from the differences in endowments,
objectives  and  cultural  background  of  the  users.  This  paper  aims  to  identify  such
heterogeneities  and  possibly  try  to  discuss  their  implications.   The  leaders  in  CPR
management (CPRM )are those who are rich or hold large number of livestock.  Gender
inequality also plays a major role in terms of extended benefits of CPRs. It is found that
women are generally at loss in terms of unequal benefits received by them. The interesting
irony is that the females are major players in the collection of CPR but they are not involved
in  the  decision  making  for  CPRM.  They  make  up a  nearly  non-existent  section  for  this
purpose.
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1. Introduction
There are different types of heterogeneity arising from the differences in endowments,
objectives  and  cultural  background  of  the  users  of  CPRs.  A  considerable  amount  of
theoretical  and empirical  research has focused on the heterogeneity of assets.  Theoretical
arguments have been made for the relationship between asset heterogeneity and successful
efforts in the context of regulating the use of CPR. 
Olson (1965) hypothesized that the probability of collective action is greater given
that the wealth inequality amongst the members of the group is large. As developing societies
are highly stratified, they are also characterized by deep divisions or inequalities in status,
power,  income,  gender,  caste,  assets  and  race.  These  differences  can  structure  the  user
behaviour which may reinforce socio-cultural and economic differences. For example, they
can  affect  user  perceptions  of  the  forest  management,  influence  attitudes  of  trust  and
determine their level of shared interest. Much community based forest management (CBFM)
literature has implicitly criticized this idea, arguing that the presence of social heterogeneity
makes it difficult for users to come together, agree and commit themselves to common goals.
Even if it is not an initial obstacle to organisation, high levels of social heterogeneity may
adversely affect the outcome of CBFM. Heterogeneity may determine which group or groups
ultimately  benefit  from CBFM.  A lack  of  income  and  power  generally  leads  to  greater
discrimination,  low  levels  of  participation,  and  conflicts  over  resources  and  ultimately
exclusion from the benefits of CBFM.  
The  result  of  the  efforts  put  by  the  CPRM  members  is  affected  by  the  culture,
conventions, the institutional arrangements, and the attributes of people's behaviour in terms
of work ethics in a given society. Orientation towards group action, motivation of the group
members, sharing systems also affect the output of the efforts for social capital formation. 
According to Varughese and Ostrom (2001), forest product preferences are dependent
on  the  economic  as  well  as  the  social  and  cultural  conditions  of  a  community.  As
communities pass through different stages of economic growth, product preferences of people
move  from unprocessed  raw  products,  such  as  NTFPs,  fuel  wood,  and  poles  for  house
construction, to quality products such as furniture and paper products, and finally to outdoor
recreation  and  environmental  values.  Hence,  even  in  small  traditional  communities,
differential impacts of economic growth will increase product preference heterogeneity.
A study by Kant (1999) shows that the members of the user group will often have
somewhat different preferences regarding resource management or assign different priorities
to the various objectives of resource management. This can be either because of differing
personal  interests  in  the  resource  or  different  levels  of  involvement  in  the  social  group.
People think of themselves both as separate ‘individuals’ and as ‘members of a social group’.
In traditional societies, where people see themselves first as members of the group first and
afterwards as independent individuals, an inherent spirit of co-operation is generally present
in the presence of large economic differences and social stratification. 
Bista (1991) finds that the prevailing heterogeneity has created deep inequities within
the society that are manifested in unequal power relations, which are defined by caste, class,
gender  and  regional  settlement.  These  inequities  are  further  enhanced  by the  inadequate
support of government, gap in policy implementation and poor governance at the community
level.
2. Types of Heterogeneity
Kant (2000) proposes that heterogeneity with regard to CPR management is at three
different levels. Economic, socio-cultural, and other social differences form a basic level of
heterogeneity. Due to this basic heterogeneity, members of the user group may have diverse
preferences for timber and NTFPs and hence prefer to harvest different mixtures of products.
Further, preference over diversified forest products often leads to different preferences for
resource management regimes. The preference for different resource management regimes
forms the third-level heterogeneity. Findings of studies on heterogeneity with respect to caste,
wealth and location are given below.
2.1 Caste Heterogeneity
Among the local factors of socio-economic conditions, heterogeneity of community
groups or social factionalism has pronounced influence on the effectiveness of community
institutions.  Due  to  the  presence  of  different  caste  groups,  it  is  difficult  to  bring  the
community  members  to  a  common  agreement  for  resource  use.  This  may  give  birth  to
conflicts. It is then important to initiate activities of common interest in these communities.
This will  require more rigorous efforts to sensitise them for the common good to initiate
sustainable  collective  action.  It  becomes  difficult  to  co-operate  and  come  to  common
agreement for people and hence it is more important to generate a feeling of cooperation and
foster social capital.  The local conditions of scarcity of forest resource can also become a
motivating  factor  if  the people  are  sensitised  about  the hardships  caused to  them due to
scarcity.
Kafle (2008) finds that there is less probability for households belonging to lower
castes being elected as a member of a decision-making unit within local forest management
institutions (e.g. executive committee of a CFUG). Instead local elites, often from upper caste
backgrounds,  are  found  to  be  advantaged  in  accessing  the  decision-making  unit  of  the
community forest management institutions.
The extent to which enterprise activities need to explicitly target the poor may depend
upon the level of internal heterogeneity in a community. “Even if a person from the lower
caste group is represented on the committee, their views are often disregarded and have less
bargaining power at community meetings and assemblies” [Thapa et al. (1998)]. “In terms of
resource exploitation,  it  is  observed that  lower caste  households  are  benefiting  less  from
community  forests  than  households  belonging  to  higher  caste  groups”  [Adhikari  et  al.
(2004)].
According  to  Adhikari  &  Lovett  (2006),  Nepal  demonstrates  a  distinct  social
stratification  based  on  the  caste  system  and  encompasses  a  wider  socio-economic
heterogeneity.  The dogma of the caste system still is a contentious issue. So, it acts as an
obstacle in the development of communities belonging to the lower social class. The lower
caste  people often face a multitude  of disadvantages  in land endowment,  socio-economic
marginalisation,  participation  in decision-making processes  and employment  opportunities
[Lawati (2005)]. The caste system and the practices related to it  have been outlawed and
declared punishable offences but these laws are difficult to implement. Untouchability still
exists in the hills and mountains and in the urban areas of Nepal.  Janajatis  (various ethnic
groups) and lower-caste people such as  Dalits  still live in conditions of great poverty and
social disadvantage. They form the most impoverished segment of the society.
In Indian villages, access to local CPRs is often restricted to privileged caste groups.
According to Beteille (1983) the outcasts or schedule castes are often among the poorest of
the  poor  and  are  frequently  excluded  in  the  decision-making  process.  Similarly  others
identified that there was no role for groups belonging to the lower social  status in forest
management  decision-making [see for example Sundar  (1997)].  In JFM also,  it  has been
observed in India that the structural dominance is enjoyed by more powerful groups. 
2.2 Wealth Heterogeneity
Wealth level also plays a great role in CPRM. The right over productive resources,
labour capacity,  skills  about forest  endowment  transformation,  technology and equipment
determine the level of use, sale and conversion of forest endowment into entitlement. The
rich people have greater amount of such resource. As a result they have greater amount of
entitlement. Generally it has been observed that the rich people are also rich in the private
resource  endowments  like  land,  livestock,  labour  capacities  and  skill  development
programme. The poor section does not possess such resources. As a result they have lesser
amount for use and sell after transforming. “People’s interest in forest resources differs based
on whether they raise cattle for milk or goats for meat, run a teashop or restaurant, weave
baskets and mats,  make charcoal or furniture,  prepare medicine from forest products, use
oxen for draught  or  just  cook food for the family”  [Varughese & Ostrom (2001)].  Most
households need the forests for almost all of the above reasons but only for subsistence.
Differences in wealth relate directly to the extent of economic stratification within the
group which, in turn, partially depends upon the occupation or livelihood strategy of each
household. According to Adhikari (2005), household wealth endowment is expected to affect
benefits from forests directly as productive wealth creates more opportunities for better-off
households  to  use  biomass  resources,  while  social  reputation  of  wealthy  individuals  has
indirect effects. In rural areas where most of the people are subsistence farmers, differences
in wealth are  evidenced by the  extent  of  land and livestock  holdings.  Households  better
endowed with  land and livestock  holdings  are  expected  to  have  greater  need for  animal
fodder and agriculture compost  [Varughese & Ostrom (2001) among others].  Hence they
benefit more from forests because forests are an important source of intermediate products
that serve as inputs in the farming system. The wealthy of a community may have many more
alternatives to using a particular forest for their livelihood than the less endowed members of
that  community.  This  makes  for  an  imbalance  of  interest  in  organizing  governance  and
management of a forest.
Wealthier farmers are frequently able to construct the alternative fuel sources such as
methane gas producing compost pits, which supply them with cooking and lighting gas. They
tend to have some surplus food and cash for modern medicine as well, and depend less than
the poor do upon the forests for fuel, food and herbal cures. These differences, even among
subsistence  farmers,  can generate  different  incentives  among them for forest  use and for
devising  cooperative  arrangements  for  forest  governance  and management  [Varughese &
Ostrom (2001)].
Tole (2010) finds that despite an equal distribution of tree endowments among village
users,  the entitlement  to  use forests  is  unequal.  Wealthier  households  are  able  to  exploit
particular forest species for commercial benefits, and their greater income has allowed them
to hire workers with specialized skills to remove produce. Resource-rich farmers have more
trees in private lands usually sufficient to meet their forest product needs. They are interested
in conserving the forests for long-term gains. This is generally in line with the interests of the
DFO staff.  On the  contrary,  the  forest-dependent  resource-poor  farmers  are  found to  be
interested in using the forest for immediate livelihoods benefits. Elite also develop power
nexus  with  other  stakeholders  at  village  and  district  levels  and  use  the  same  to  remain
influential at the CFUG.
The impact of farm size on membership in forest user groups however follow a U
shaped pattern implying that households at the two tails of the distribution of farm size are
more likely to participate in collective action than those in the middle [Mariara & Gachoki
(2008)]. The above mentioned relationship is depicted in Figure1.
Figure 1 Relationship between the farm size and membership in CFUG.
Mariara  and Gachoki  (2008)  also  support  the  fact  that  number  of  livestock  units
owned is positively correlated with forest participation and membership in forest user groups.
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Figure 2 shows the relationship  between the  livestock owned by the CPR users  and the
membership of such people in the CFUG.
Figure 2 Relationship between the livestock ownership and membership in CFUG
                                     
Figure 3 shows the positive relation of the livestock ownership with the level of 
collective action. As more and more livestock is owned by the users, their participation in the 
collective action also increases.
Figure 3 Relationship between the livestock and participation in the collective action.
                      
While  many have  argued that  heterogeneity  of  assets  is  negatively  related  to  the
capacity of a group to self-organise, Olson (1965) argued that groups were “privileged” when
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one or several members owned a higher proportion of assets that would be benefited by some
form of collective action. While too much disparity in wealth distribution diminishes shared
interest  in  the  collective  good,  some inequality  of  wealth  provides  incentives  for  certain
individuals in the community to bear the disproportionate share in the costs associated with
organising  collective  action.  However,  Angelsen  and  Wunder  (2003)  note  that  forest
activities  have low entry costs  and have few requirements  in  terms of skills  and capital,
making it quite easy for the poor to participate.
2.3 Location/ Area of Residence
The location of user and settlement pattern also influence the use of forest resources.
People's  residence near to the forest  gives  them greater  entitlement  than other  household
whose residence is farthest. Distance to the forest is negatively and strongly correlated with
resource extraction, more so fodder and other materials.
In  a  CFUG,  the  inability  to  distinguish  between members  with  different  interests
results in net benefits being proportionately large for those who live at a distance because
they would not participate in the maintenance and yet obtain the products. 
2.4 Other Factors
Age may also  reduce  forest  dependence  as  older  people  may  have  less  time  and
physical strength to engage in forest activities. Forest dependence may also reduce with age
as the age of the household head is related to the household’s experience in managing CPRs
as well as accumulation of social capital [Kohlin & Parks (2001) among others]. According
to Adhikari (2005), age of the household head (in years) is expected to capture the extent to
which household labour allocation changes over the life-cycle of the head of the household.
Vedeld et al. (2004) has found that young households may be clearing more forest to build up
a sufficient amount of cropping or pasture land. Angelsen and Wunder (2003) and World
Resource Institute (2005), also say that the poor often use forest products due to permanent or
temporary lack of better alternatives.
According  to  Shively  and  Pagiola  (2004),  “Education  of  the  household  head  is
expected to lead to extraction of fewer forest resources since education opens up alternative
employment  opportunities  and  diverts  people  from subsistence  agriculture  and  gathering
activities”. Vedeld et al. (2004) further argue that the impact of education, like age may be a
cultural factor where going to the forest is considered backward and not for the elderly or the
well educated. “Technology, knowledge and skills are expected to enhance the efficiency of
harvesting forest products” [Adhikari (2005)]. 
Participation in village institutions is also expected to affect the extent of forest use
and  thus  economic  benefit  from the  commons.  Participation  enhances  awareness  of  the
potential gains from forests as institutions are an important source of relevant information,
including information on policy changes that directly affect forest communities [Gaspert et
al. (1999); Adhikari (2005)]. According to Vedeld et al. (2004), other important institutional
characteristics include customary rules governing forest/product use, government regulations
affecting resource use and changes in rights governing resource use. World Resource Institute
(2005)  finds  out  that  many  previous  studies  concur  that  efforts  to  promote  sustainable
livelihoods  among  the  poor  are  more  successful  when  they  simultaneously  promote
ecosystem stewardship and democratic governance.
3. Gender Inequality and CPRM
A form of heterogeneity that has received considerably less attention in the CBFM
literature is that of gender inequality. According to Tole (2010), access to CBFM programs
and their associated benefits does not depend only on differences in income and status, but
also-  on cultural  beliefs  and norms prescribing women’s  appropriate  roles  and degree  of
participation in society. These in turn are reinforced by income differences and institutions
such as the degree of legal protection and political freedom and rights accorded to women by
society.
3.1 Participation
According to Chapagain (2007), women’s participation in CFUGs may be classified
into two broad categories  i.e.  participation  in  implementation  of  activities  such as  in  the
conservation and exploitation of resources and participation in decision-making. Participation
in  the  implementation  of  activities  does  not  necessarily  mean  effective  participation  in
decision-making.  Effective  participation  requires  that  people's  views are effectively taken
into account and their views influence decision-making.
Aggarwal  (2000) finds  that  institutions  for  natural  resource  management  (such as
CFGs), which appear to be participative, equitable and efficient, can be found lacking on all
three counts from a gender perspective. There is little to suggest that women are inherently
more conservationist than men, but the distinctness of women’s social networks embodying
prior experience of successful cooperation, their higher dependence on these networks and
their potentially greater group homogeneity relative to men, could provide an important base
for managing a sustainable environmental collective action. This is largely ignored.
The  exclusion  from  CBFM  programs  is  particularly  prevalent  where  gender
inequalities in income, assets and political endowments are prevalent to a very high level.
Most male resistance to women’s involvement in forest management occurs where women
are  illiterate  and  very  poor  and  men  have  worked  on  forest  related  matters  since  time
immemorial.  Despite  their  unequal  position,  women  are  enlisted  to  help  with  forest
management because men often do not do their job up to the needed level.
However, even in communities that allows women’s participation in outside activities,
culturally  prescribed  beliefs  and  attitudes  towards  women  often  present  considerable
obstacles to the success of CBFM programs [Aggarwal (1997), (2001)]. Tole (2010) finds
that there are parts of Nepal and the Uttar Pradesh hills in India where women are active
participants in forestry management though the number of such participants is not very high.
Moreover,  participation  in  is  often  unequal  because  women  are  excluded  from  making
important  decisions  regarding  the  management  of  forests.  In  both  countries,  women  are
seldom consulted  about  forest  issues,  and their  preferences  for  specific  species  are  often
overlooked.  For  instance,  women  prefer  domestic  species  because  they  provide  multiple
subsistence  benefits,  whereas  men  prefer  non-native  species  for  their  income  generation
potential.
Women’s  limited participation in decision-making also means that they have little
influence in the framing of rules on forest use, monitoring, benefit distribution, etc. It has
implications for both distributional equity and efficiency. The persistent shortages of CPRs
which women face are because of their lack of voice and bargaining power in the CFUGs,
than from a lack of aggregate availability. Despite their virtual absence from male-controlled
CFUGs, women often play an active role in the protection efforts as they keep an informal
lookout  or  form  patrol  groups  parallel  to  men’s  as  they  feel  that  men’s  patrolling  is
ineffective. 
It has been found that women usually constitute less than 10 percent of the CFUG
general body membership in both India and Nepal. In India’s JFM programme, for instance,
membership at the household level is 70 percent to 80 percent in many villages, and in some
cases it is 100 percent. The women so included usually constitute a nominal rather than an
effective presence. The reason is that they are seldom selected or elected by village women as
their representatives or for their leadership qualities. But even where membership is open to
women,  their  presence  is  sparse  as  women’s  own  economic  endowments  (e.g.,  asset
ownership) and personal attributes (educational level,  self-confidence,  leadership qualities,
etc.) do not match up to the men [Aggarwal (2000)].
From the women who are General Body or Executive body members, only a small
percentage usually attend the meetings. If they do attend, they rarely speak up, and if they
speak, their opinions carry little weight. Some characteristic responses are shared below1:
What is the point of going to meetings? We would only sit silently.  (Panasa Diha
village, Orissa, 1998)
Men  don’t  listen,  except  perhaps  one  or  two.  Men  feel  that  they  should  be  the
spokespersons. (Garbe Kuna forest, Kaski district, Nepal, 1998)
I attend the van panchayat meetings, but I only sign, I don’t say much. Or I say I
agree. (Sallarautela Village, UP hills 1998)
Eight JFM states allow only one member per household and this is inevitably the male
household  head.  In  some states,  both  spouses  are  members,  but  this  still  excludes  other
household adults. Many CBFM programs simply fail to include women as equal participants
if they include them. A large number of field studies reflect this exclusion despite formal
efforts to include women [Tole (2010)].
Literacy  levels  often  determine  which  women  are  nominated  to  JFM  executive
committees where the rules make women’s inclusion mandatory. In general, women’s lower
average  level  of  education,  relative  to  men’s,  not  only  forms  biased  perceptions  about
women’s abilities but also affects their actual ability to gain information on rules, to check
the accuracy of minutes on the decisions made, and so on.
Aggarwal (1989) finds that the ability of females to fulfil the responsibility of being
the sole economic providers is significantly constrained by the limited resources and means at
their  command.  This  constraint  stems  not merely from their  class  position  but  also from
1 Aggarwal Bina (2001)
gender.  These  gender  inequities  in  access  to  resources  take  varying  forms:  intra-family
differences  in  the distribution  of  basic  necessities;  women’s  systematically  disadvantaged
position in the labour market; their little access to the crucial means of production- land and
associated  production  technology;  and the  growing  deterioration  and privatization  of  the
country’s CPRs on which the poor and women depend in substantial degree for sustenance.
3.2 Unequal Benefits
Gender inequities characterise CFGs in the sharing of both costs and benefits. While
costs associated with membership fees, patrolling time or the forest guard’s pay are usually
borne by men, the costs of forgoing forest use are largely borne by women. 
Inequities  also stem from the  distribution  of  benefits  from protection.  In  some cases  the
benefits are not distributed at all but put into a collective fund and used by the groups as they
see fit. A number of the autonomous groups in Orissa managed by all male youth clubs, for
instance,  have  been  selling  forest  products,  including  the  wood  obtained  from  thinning
operations, and using the proceeds for religious festivities, a club house, or club functions
[Agrawal (2001)]. 
Women might gain indirectly if the benefits are in kind for example, firewood. But if
the  benefits  are  in  cash,  then  the  money  distributed  to  male  members  is  seldom shared
equitably within the family. In many cases, the men spend the money on gambling, liquor or
personal items. “In a meeting of three JFM villages of West Bengal, women, when asked
about benefit-sharing, all wanted equal and separate shares for husbands and wives” [Sarin
(1995)]. Since the women now demand their own share in the benefits as a condition for
joining, the attempts to enlist more women members into CFUGs may prove unsuccessful,
where existing CFUG rules allow only one share per household. 
Since  the  main  responsibility  for  firewood  and  fodder  collection,  animal  care,
cooking, etc. falls on women, they also end up shouldering the burden of finding other fuel
and fodder sources when the forest is closed. Women, who don’t own land or trees, bear the
biggest costs of forest  closure.  Physical  exclusion from forests due to strict  closure rules
means that in order to meet basic subsistence needs, women must go elsewhere. It poses high
opportunity costs as it includes time spent in searching for alternative sites for firewood and
fodder, using inferior substitute fuels, stalls feeding animals, losing income earlier obtained
from selling forest products etc. “It also means travelling long distances to obtain produce
from other forests; a job that may involve all female members of the household, including
daughters, with negative consequences for the latter’s education” [Tole (2010)].
In countries like India, men are the head of the household and usufruct rights under
CBFM  programs  are  registered  in  their  name  only.  Women  are  hence  often  denied  the
income stream from commercial forest enterprises which are viewed as masculine pursuits
[Aggarwal (2001)]. Moreover, because women are often excluded from community forests,
they have little input into rule making and have little stake in rule compliance. As a result,
illegal  encroachment  by women is  common.  On the other  hand, community forests  have
suffered from a loss of input of women’s expertise and labour. Women can easily use their
indigenous knowledge of the requirements and benefits of growing individual tree species
and they also generally appreciate the need to maintain biodiversity [Tole (2010)].
3.3 Efficiency
According  to  Aggarwal  (2000),  the  systematic  exclusion  of  one  gender  from
consultation,  decision-making,  and management  of  new planting  programmes  is  likely  to
have  negative  efficiency  implications,  by  failing  to  tap  woman’s  knowledge  of  diverse
species  for  enhancing  biodiversity  and  their  understanding  of  traditional  silvicultural
practices as they are better informed about the planting species. Information about the rules
framed, or changes in rules, such as in membership eligibility conditions or on other aspects
of  forest  management;  do  not  always  filter  down  to  the  women.  There  is  no  inbuilt
mechanism for their  feedback too. If consulted,  women usually suggest less stringent and
more egalitarian rules. 
Efficiency issues can arise from inaccurate  assessments  of resource depletion.  For
example, there can be gender differences in abilities to identify the state of the local resource
base. It is women who regularly have to collect firewood, grasses and NTFPs. Hence, their
lack of involvement  in framing working rules for protection and use creates  non-abiding
tendencies in the users.
Aggarwal  (2000)  finds  that  in  South  Asia,  women’s  virtual  absence  from  their
decision-making bodies is significantly prevalent. Also it has been observed that significant
gender  inequalities  in  the  distribution  of  costs  and benefits,  and a  range of  observed or
potential inefficiencies in functioning exist in CPRM institutions. Inefficiencies, for instance,
are likely to arise from rule enforcement problems, imperfections in the information flow,
inaccurate  assessments  of  resource  depletion,  and  problems  in  catching  transgressors.
Unsatisfactory conflict resolution and non-incorporation of women’s specific knowledge of
species  also lead to problems in CPRM. Some of these factors could obstruct successful
cooperation  even  in  the  short  term;  others  could  affect  the  long  term  sustainability  of
arrangements for communal resource management, or cause them to fall short of attaining
their production potential. Increase in women participation had effect on other several aspects
of  institutional  functioning.  Women  members  tend  to  take  responsibility  of  occasional
patrolling of the area to control women offenders, which are difficult to be controlled by male
members  and  they  also  try  to  form  self  help  groups  and  raise  their  voice  in  various
community affairs.
“In  many  ways  gender  discrimination  reproduces  biases  in  social  capital  as  does
poverty and inequality, reinforcing male domination and power and excluding women from
participating in CBFM. Women’s presence has a strongly positive influence on the degree of
reciprocity, solidarity and level of conflict” [Tole (2010)].
Hence the term heterogeneity is used to describe asymmetric distributions of wealth
and power, different preferences, opportunity costs, unequal claims to natural resources and
socio-cultural differences within a community. Heterogeneity also encompass economic and
social inequalities, i.e. inequalities in sacrifices made by community members in cooperating
with forest management, inequalities in outside earning opportunities, cultural heterogeneity
and location differences.
4. Conclusion
The aim of the paper was to bring out various heterogeneities prevalent in CPR use
and its management and their implications. It is evident from the above discussion that the
existence  of  various  types  of  heterogeneity  makes  the  common  property  resource
management biased. The rich households or the households having more number of livestock
are better placed as far as the participation in CPRM is concerned. Further, gender inequality
is also evident from the discussion. Women get affected if the benefits are in cash instead of
kind like firewood. They also have a minimal or no participation in decision making process.
Their lack of involvement in framing working rules for protection and use of a CPR creates
non-abiding tendencies in the users.
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